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Disinterested Directors, Independent Directors and
the Investment Company Act of 1940
JOEL H. GOLDBERG*
INTRODUCTION
To help protect registered investment companies against conflicts
of interest on the part of their management, the Investment Com-
pany Act of 19401 generally prohibits more than sixty percent of
such a company's directors from being associated with the com-
pany's management.' However, it is clear that the original framers
of the Investment Company Act did not contemplate that the over-
sight of directors who are not associated with an investment com-
pany's management would be sufficient by itself to protect such
companies against conflicts of interest. Thus, the Act prohibits a
wide variety of transactions on the part of investment companies,
at least without Commission permission, even if the transactions are
approved by directors not associated with the company's manage-
ment.
The extent of dissociation from management required on the part
of a minority of investment companies' directors was increased
somewhat in 1970 when the Investment Company Act was amended
to require that such directors not be "interested persons" of the
company,' instead of requiring merely that they not be "affiliated
* Mr. Goldberg serves as Associate Council for Fiduciary Responsibility, Office of the
Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor. He received his B.A. from Brandeis University and his
J.D. from Columbia University, and is a member of the New York Bar. At the time this article
was written, he was Special Counsel to the Director, Division of Investment Management,
Securities and Exchange Commission. As a matter of policy, the Securities and Exchange
Commission disclaims responsibility for private publications by any of its current or former
employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Commission or of the author's former colleagues on the staff of the Commis-
sion.
1. Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970), as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et. seq. (Supp. V 1975)).
2. Section 80a-10 of the Act as amended in 1970 provides: "(a) No registered investment
company shall have a board of directors more than 60 per centum of which are interested
persons of such registered company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970).
3. "Interested person" is defined in § 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act:
(A) when used with respect to an investment company-
(i) any affiliated person of such company,
(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affili-
ated person of such company,
(iii) any interested person of any investment adviser of or principal underwriter
for such company,
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 9
persons" 4 of the company, as had previously been the case.5 In
addition, the role of disinterested directors in major decisions of
beginning of the last two fiscal years of such company has acted as legal counsel
for such company,
(v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
any affiliated person of such a broker or dealer, and
(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined
to be an interested person by reason of having had, at any time since the beginning
of the last two fiscal years of such company, a material business or professional
relationship with such company or with the principal executive officer of such
company or with any other investment company having the same investment ad-
viser or principal underwriter or with the principal executive officer of such other
investment company:
Provided, That no person shall be deemed to be an interested person of an
investment company solely by reason of (aa) his being a member of its board of
directors or advisory board or an owner of its securities, or (bb) his membership in
the immediate family of any person specified in clause (aa) of this proviso; and
(B) when used with respect to an investment adviser of or principal underwriter
for any investment company-
(i) any affiliated person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affili-
ated person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(iii) any person who knowingly has any direct or indirect beneficial interest in,
or who is designated as trustee, executor, or guardian of any legal interest in, any
security issued either by such investment adviser or principal underwriter or by a
controlling person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the
beginning of the last two fiscal years of such investment company has acted as legal
counsel for such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(v) any broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or
any affiliated person of such a broker or dealer, and
(vi) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined
to be an interested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning
of the last two fiscal years of such investment company a material business or
professional relationship with such investment adviser or principal underwriter or
with the principal executive officer or any controlling person of such investment
adviser or principal underwriter .. .
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
4. "Affiliated person" is defined in § 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to
vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person;
(B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other
person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copart-
ner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment
company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board
thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company not
having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1970).
5. Section 80a-10 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provided in part:
(a)[N]o registered investment company shall have a board of directors more than
60 per centum of the members of which are persons who are investment advisers
of, affiliated persons of an investment adviser of, or officers or employees of, such
Independent Directors
investment companies was modified and, in some ways, expanded
when the Investment Company Act was amended in 1970 and again
in 1975.6 Nonetheless, even after these amendments, the Investment
Company Act continued to impose a thoroughgoing system of regu-
lation on investment companies.
The imposition of regulatory strictures as a substitute for, or at
least a supplement to, the judgment of disinterested investment
company directors is undoubtedly justified by the fact that many
such directors do not have either the expertise and sophistication
or the access to expert advice necessary to protect an investment
company adequately against conflicts of interest on the part of its
management. However, the 1977 opinion of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Tannenbaum v. Zeller7 suggests that a
distinction can be made between those investment company direc-
tors who are merely "disinterested" within the meaning of the
Investment Company Act, and those who are not only disinter-
ested but also genuinely independent: that is, capable of exercis-
ing informed judgment with regard to an investment company's
affairs without relying upon the advice of the company's manage-
ment. It would be difficult, and it might even be impossible, to
formulate and apply standards of general applicability for defining
genuinely independent investment company directors, and it is not
the purpose of this article to propose such standards. However,
this article is intended to suggest that, if a means could be found
to determine which investment company directors were in fact inde-
pendent, it might be feasible to substitute the judgment of such
directors, at least in part, for some of the regulatory strictures now
imposed upon investment companies. The benefits which such a
substitution could produce for the investment company industry,
public shareholders, and the federal government would be so signifi-
cant that an attempt should be made to formulate a means of deter-
mining independence on the part of investment company directors,
notwithstanding the difficulty and uncertain success of such an
undertaking.
registered company.
Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, § 10, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970)).
6. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(1970); and Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 163 (1975).
7. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
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REQUIREMENTS OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT CONCERNING
DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS
Before the 1970 Amendments
Until the Investment Company Act was amended in 1970,1 it
contained no reference to "interested persons." 9 However, using the
more limited concept of "affiliated person,"' 0 section 10(a) of the
original Act, like section 10(a) of the Act as now amended, provided
in effect that, in general, no more than sixty percent of a registered
investment company's board of directors could consist of persons
associated with the company's investment adviser." The fact that
this provision permitted a majority of an investment company's
directors to be affiliated with the investment adviser suggests that
the framers of the Act contemplated only a limited role for the
unaffiliated directors in safeguarding the interests of the company's
public shareholders.
This conclusion is reinforced by the presence of numerous other
provisions of the Act which limit the discretion of an investment
company's management to engage in various types of transactions
or activities, regardless of whether those transactions or activities
are approved by the company's unaffiliated directors. For example,
8. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413
(1970).
9. For the statutory definition of "interested person" under the 1970 amendments, see
note 3 supra.
10. For the statutory definition of "affiliated person" under the Act, see note 4 supra.
11. For the original text of § 80a-10a, see note 5 supra. However, under § 10(b) of the Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1940), if any of the investment company's directors, officers, or em-
ployees served as, or was affiliated with, a principal underwriter or regular broker for the
company, a majority of the board of directors had to be unaffiliated with that underwriter or
broker. A similar provision is made in the present § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1970), using
the "interested person" concept. Additionally, in the original Act, as well as in the Act as
amended, an exception was made in § 10(d) for a certain type of open-end, no-load company
the investment adviser of which is engaged principally in the business of managing individual
accounts rather than investment companies. If the company meets this and other specified
requirements, all except one of its directors may be interested persons of the company. This
exception apparently had its origin when, at the congressional hearings preceding passage of
the Act in 1940, a partner in the investment counsel firm of Scudder, Stevens & Clark
indicated that that firm had formed investment companies in order to pool the assets of
clients whose accounts would otherwise be too small to manage economically. See Hearings
on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 700-01 (1940)(testimony of James N. White) [hereinafter cited as 1940 Senate
Hearings]. The Scudder, Stevens & Clark official argued that it would be unnecessary and
unfair to force these investment companies to increase the representation of unaffiliated
directors on their boards to more than the one such director which they already had, id. at
703, and this argument seems to have persuaded the drafters of the Act to provide the
exception contained in § 10(d). See Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 111 (1940) (testimony of
David Schenker) [hereinafter cited as 1940 House Hearings].
Independent Directors
sections 17(a) and 17(b) of the Act, taken together, prohibit, among
other things, purchases or sales of property from or to a registered
investment company by an affiliated person of the company unless
an order permitting the transaction has been issued by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission.' 2 A somewhat similar prohibition is
contained in section 17(d) of the Act with respect to joint transac-
tions between registered investment companies and their affiliates."
Furthermore, although the prohibitions of section 17 are aimed
mainly at alleviating the danger of a conflict of interest where a
person associated with the company's management or some other
affiliated person of the company deals with it, activities involving
conflicts of interest are not the only ones prohibited or limited by
the Investment Company Act. For example, section 18(a) delimits
the circumstances under which a registered closed-end investment
company may issue senior securities,' 4 and section 18(f) generally
prohibits registered open-end investment companies from issuing
senior securities at all, although such companies are permitted to
borrow from banks subject to certain conditions."5 Other provisions
of the Investment Company Act that provide regulatory protection
to investors with regard to matters which do not necessarily involve
a conflict of interest on the part of persons affiliated with the invest-
ment company are sections 22(a)-(d), concerning the pricing of
open-end investment company shares,'" section 22(e), concerning
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(a), 17(b)(1970).
13. Id. § 80a-17(d). Unlike § 17(a), § 17(d) is not self-effecting; it only prohibits transac-
tions in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt pursuant
to that section. Pursuant to the authority provided in § 17(d), the Commission has adopted
rule 17d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 (1977), which generally prohibits transactions within the
purview of that section in the absence of a Commission order permitting the transaction.
Other differences between § 17(a) and § 17(d) are discussed in Rosenblat & Lybecker, Some
Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External Investment Management Ar-
rangements and the ALI Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 587, 598-99, 643
(1976).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)(1970).
15. Id. § 80a-18(f). It might be noted that, although most of the prohibitions of the
Investment Company Act (such as those contained in § 18) do not include a specific provision
for exemptive orders of the Commission like that set forth in § 17(b), it is not really accurate
to speak of an outright prohibition being imposed by the Investment Company Act. This is
because § 6(c) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970) empowers the Commission to grant
exemptions from any provision of the Act "if and to the extent that such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors
and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of" the Act.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22(a)-(d). Sections 22(a) and (c), taken together, in effect give the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and the Commission authority to
make rules to prevent mutual fund shares from being priced in a manner which will dilute
the value of already outstanding shares. Section 22(b), as amended in 1970, in effect gives
the NASD and the Commission rulemaking authority to prevent excessive sales loads. Sec-
19781
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suspension of the right of redemption of open-end shares, 7 section
22(f), regarding restrictions on transferability or negotiability of
such shares,' 8 and section 22(g), concerning the sale of open-end
shares for other than cash or securities.'" Provisions with respect to
the distribution and repurchase of closed-end investment company
shares are set forth in section 23 of the Act.'"
The existence of these and other provisions indicate that, from the
outset, the framers of the Investment Company Act intended to rely
at least as much upon regulatory strictures as upon the oversight of
unaffiliated directors to ensure that investment company share-
holders would be protected not only with regard to dealings by the
company with affiliated persons who might have a conflict of inter-
est, but also with regard to other activities on the part of investment
companies which might endanger the interests of investors. Further
evidence of the limited role envisioned for unaffiliated directors
under the Investment Company Act can be found in the Act's legis-
lative history. The original version of the legislation would have
required, in section 10(a), that a majority of an investment com-
pany's directors be unaffiliated with the company's investment ad-
viser.2' In explaining why this provision was modified in later ver-
sions of the legislation to require only that forty percent of the
directors be unaffiliated with the investment adviser, David
Schenker, one of the Commission's primary spokesmen at the legis-
lative hearings leading to passage of the Act,2 2 stated the following
at the hearings in the House of Representatives:
tion 22(d) generally prohibits the sale of mutual fund shares to the public except at a current
offering price described in the prospectus, and therefore in effect prohibits mutual fund
dealers from discounting the sales load. The purpose of this section has been the subject of
some controversy. On the one hand, it has been suggested that § 22(d) was intended to
eliminate a price-competitive secondary market in mutual fund shares which was, under this
theory, disrupting mutual fund distribution systems and resulting in discrimination among
investors. See, e.g., Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual Fund Shares Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 37 U. Drr. L.J. 369, 370-73 (1960). Other commentators,
however, have suggested that the purpose of § 22(d) was to prevent mutual fund insiders from
purchasing shares at less than net asset value and thereby diluting the value of other share-
holders' investments. See Heffernan & Jorden, Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act
of 1940-Its Original Purpose and Present Function, 1973 DUKE L.J. 975.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970).
18. Id. § 80a-22(f).
19. Id. § 80a-22(g).
20. Id. § 80a-23.
21. 1940 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 8.
22. Mr. Schenker was the Commission's counsel for the Investment Trust Study, SEC,
Report on Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 279, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1939). That study largely formed the basis of the Act.
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[Tihe argument was made that it is difficult for a person or firm
to undertake the management of an investment company, give
advice, when the majority of the board may repudiate that advice.
It was urged that if a person is buying management of a particular
person and if the majority of the board can repudiate his advice,
then in effect, you are depriving the stockholders of that person's
advice.
Now, that made sense to us. If the stockholders want A's man-
agement, than [sic] A should have the right to impose his invest-
ment advice on that company. However, we felt that there should
be some check on the management and that is why the provision
for 40 percent of independents was inserted. 23
After the 1970 Amendments
In 1966, the SEC issued its Report on the Public Policy Implica-
tions of Investment Company Growth (PPI).24 In that report, the
Commission expressed concern that the fees paid by open-end in-
vestment companies to their external investment advisers might be
higher than necessary, 21 and it ascribed excessive mutual fund advi-
sory fees in part to "the difficulty of effective action by unaffiliated
directors." 6
In elaborating upon the role of unaffiliated directors, the Commis-
sion suggested in PPI that, although such directors often performed
a valuable service for mutual fund shareholders, the usefulness of
unaffiliated directors was limited by the several facts: they usually
served as mutual fund directors only part-time, they worked with-
out independent staff and usually without independent counsel, and
they obtained most of their information about fund operations from
employees of the company's investment adviser.27 For this and other
reasons, the Commission concluded that "in general the unaffiliated
directors have not been in a position to secure changes in the level
of advisory fee rates in the mutual fund industry." 8
As one means of increasing the effectiveness of unaffiliated direc-
tors in representing investment company shareholders' interests,
the Commission recommended that the Investment Company Act
be amended to require a greater separation between the economic
23. 1940 House Hearings, supra note 11, at 109-10.
24. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Public Policy Implications
of Investment Company Growth, H.R. RFi'. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter
cited as PPIJ.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 12.
27. Id. at 130-31.
28. Id. at 131.
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interests of such directors and the interests of the company's man-
agement than was produced by the Act's reliance upon the
"affiliated person" concept. 9 Thus, the Commission recommended
that those directors required by the Act to be unassociated with the
investment company's management be not only unaffiliated, but
also "disinterested." ' " The definition of "interested person" which
the Commission recommended be added to the Act was similar to
that now contained in section 2(a)(19), 3 ' inasmuch as the Commis-
sion's definition would have included, in addition to affiliated per-
sons, the immediate families of affiliated persons and individuals
who had had a material business or professional relationship with
an affiliated person of the company within the past three years.32
Congress adopted the Commission's suggestion that a definition
of "interested person" be added to the Investment Company Act in
order to increase the separation between the interests of an invest-
ment company's unaffiliated directors and those of its management.
In addition, as part of the 1970 amendments to the Act, Congress
adopted certain other recommendations of the Commission de-
signed to increase, to some extent, the effectiveness of disinterested
directors' oversight with regard to investment companies' affairs.
Specifically, the Commission recommended,3 3 and Congress en-
acted, requirements that the vote of disinterested directors with
respect to investment advisory and principal underwriting con-
tracts, as well as with respect to the selection of independent audi-
tors, be cast in person.Y Section 15(c) of the Act was also amended
in 1970 to provide for a duty on the part of a registered investment
company's directors to request and evaluate, and a duty on the part
of the company's investment adviser to furnish, information neces-
29. Id. at 334.
30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
32. PPI, supra note 24, at 334.
33. Id.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(c), 80a-31(a) (1970). Section 15(c) of the Investment Company
Act now requires that investment advisory and underwriting contracts be approved by a
majority of the disinterested directors, and § 32(a) imposes a similar requirement with respect
to the selection of independent auditors. The Act had previously required that investment
advisers and principal underwriters be approved by either a shareholder vote or by the
directors who were unaffiliated with either the investment company or its investment adviser,
and that independent auditors be approved by the directors who were unaffiliated with the
investment adviser. 54 Stat. 813, 838. However, there had been no requirement that the
unaffiliated directors' votes concerning these matters be cast in person. The Commission said
in PPI that absentee votes concerning these matters had not been uncommon, and it took
the position that informed voting on the part of the directors could best be assured by
requiring physical attendance when the votes were cast. PPI, supra note 24, at 335.
[Vol. 9
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sary to evaluate the terms of an advisory contract.15
However, although these changes in the Investment Company Act
reflected a determination on the part of Congress that unaffiliated
investment company directors should be more dissociated from the
company's management and should more actively participate in
major decisions of the company than had previously been the case,
Congress indicated no willingness to reduce the extent of regulatory
checks upon directors' judgment already provided for in the Act. To
the contrary, an examination of the history of another provision
added to the Investment Company Act in 1970, section 36(b),36 sug-
gests that Congress and the Commission were as skeptical of the
ability of unaffiliated (or now, disinterested) directors to protect
public shareholders against conflicts of interest on the part of an
investment company's management as the original framers of the
Act had been in 1940.
Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act specifies that there
is a fiduciary duty on the part of a registered investment company's
investment adviser with respect to the receipt of compensation from
the company.37 Prior to the 1970 amendments, section 36 of the Act
had authorized the Commission to seek injunctive relief against an
investment company's investment adviser and other persons asso-
ciated with the company's management only in cases involving
"gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust. ' 3 In PPI, the Commission
expressed the view that this section did not provide a practical
means for preventing excessive advisory fees, 39 and suggested that
the Act be amended to provide that'the compensation received by
investment advisers from investment companies must be
"reasonable."40 As part of that recommendation, the Commission
took the position that the application of the reasonableness stan-
dard should not be affected by the fact that shareholders or directors
might have approved the advisory contract or other compensation
arrangement." The Commission explained that this portion of its
recommendation was
designed to make inapplicable to investment company manage-
ment compensation the judicial decisions which have held that
such action by shareholders or disinterested directors changes the
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970).
36. Id. § 80a-35(b).
37. Id.
38. Investment Company Act, ch. 686, title I, § 36, 54 Stat. 841 (1940).
39. PPI, supra note 24, at 143.
40. Id. at 143-44.
41. Id. at 144.
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standard from fairness to "waste." Although these decisions were
not reached in connection with a statutory standard of reasonable-
ness such as proposed by the Commission, the ineffectiveness of
shareholder and directorial approval as a restraint on management
compensation in the investment company industry makes it im-
portant to eliminate any doubt on this question. To permit such
action to impede the operation and enforcement of a Federal stan-
dard of reasonableness, as it has in the case of standards imposed
by State law, would be wholly inconsistent with the reasons for and
the purpose of such a statutory standard.2
Congress did not adopt either the Commission's recommendation
that the Act explicitly provide that advisory fees must be reasona-
ble, or its recommendation that approval by shareholders or direc-
tors not be a factor in determining whether the standard of reasona-
bleness had been met. The version of section 36(b) which Congress
did enact specified that an investment adviser has a fiduciary duty
with respect to the receipt of compensation. That pronouncement,
however, seems to have the same effect as a reasonableness standard
since it appears that a breach of fiduciary duty could occur when
the fiduciary permits the investment company to pay an unreasona-
ble charge . 3 The fiduciary duty standard was substituted for the
reasonableness standard only because the investment company in-
dustry had objected that the reasonableness standard would focus
litigation on mutual fund directors rather than advisers."
Furthermore, while Congress did not adopt the SEC's suggestion
that the Act be made to provide that the application of a standard
of reasonableness with respect to advisory fees would not be affected
by shareholders' or directors' approval of the fee, Congress did pro-
vide in section 36(b) that, in an action under that section, such
approval "shall be given such consideration by the court as is
deemed appropriate under all the circumstances."4 Although this
42. Id. at 145-46.
43. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Response to Query
by Chairman Moss Regarding the Difference Between the "Reasonableness" Standard in S.
34 and the "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" Standard of S. 2224 and H. R. 11995 With Respect to
Management Fees, Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754, and H.R. 14737 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 187, 189 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Securities and
Exchange Commission]. See also 115 CONG. REC. 13696 (1969)(remarks of Senator Bennett),
and 115 CONG. REc. 13699 (1969)(remarks of Senator Percy). It might be noted that § 36(b)
specifies that investment company shareholders, as well as the Commission, can bring actions
for breach of fiduciary duty under that section.
44. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 43, at 188-
89.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (1970).
[Vol. 9
Independent Directors
language obviously did not altogether remove approval by directors
as a factor in determining whether an advisory fee was improper, it
did prevent such approval from leaving "waste" as the only ground
upon which to attack an advisory fee." Therefore, notwithstanding
statements by the Senate Committee reporting on the bill that sec-
tion 36(b) was "not intended to shift the responsibility for managing
an investment company in the best interest of its shareholders from
the directors of such company to the judiciary,"47 and that a
"responsible determination regarding the management fee by the
directors including a majority of disinterested directors is not to be
ignored,"" it is clear that Congress felt compelled to recognize what
the Commission had described as "the ineffectiveness of share-
holder and directorial approval as a restraint on management com-
pensation in the investment company industry.""
Additional, albeit more limited, amendments to the Investment
Company Act were made in 1975 as part of the Securities Acts
Amendments. 0 Again, while these amendments on their face placed
increased emphasis upon the role of disinterested directors in pro-
tecting investment company shareholders against possible abuses
by the company's management, there appears to have been a con-
gressional determination that the discretion exercised by such direc-
tors should be limited. The 1975 amendments included the addition
of section 15(f) to the Act, which in effect permits an investment
adviser of a registered investment company to realize a profit on the
sale of its business provided certain conditions are met.5' This provi-
sion was enacted after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held
in Rosenfeld v. Black that a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
a mutual fund's investment adviser could result where the adviser
realized a profit in connection with its being replaced by another
adviser.2
One of the conditions upon the applicability of section 15(f) to
sales of advisory businesses is that, for at least three years following
46. See text accompanying note 42 supra, and S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15-
16 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Senate Hearings].
47. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 46, at 7.
48. Id. at 6.
49. See text accompanying note 42 supra. Congress, as part of the 1970 amendments, also
changed the "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" standard of the old § 36 to "breach
of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct" in the new § 36(a). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a)
(1970) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1940)). See generally Freedman & Rosenblat, Duties
to Mutual Funds, 4 REv. OF SEc. REG. 937, 938 (1971).
50. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 163 (1975).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f) (Supp. V 1975).
52. 445 F.2d 1337, 1343 (2d Cir. 1971). See also S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
71 (1975).
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the sale, disinterested persons must comprise at least seventy-five
percent of the board of directors of the investment company of
which the seller served as adviser. Furthermore, section 16(b) of the
Act was amended at the same time to provide in effect that, if
compliance with the seventy-five percent requirement of section
15(f) necessitates the election of additional disinterested directors,
those new directors must be selected and proposed for election by a
majority of the disinterested directors which the company already
has. "
Even in the narrow area of sales of advisory businesses, however,
the reliance placed upon disinterested directors to protect invest-
ment company shareholders is limited by restrictions upon the
amount and type of compensation which the directors can allow an
investment company to pay to either the old or the new adviser.
Specifically, section 15(f) permits a sale of an advisory business at
a profit only if the sale does not result in an "unfair burden" upon
the investment company.5 4 "Unfair burden" is defined explicitly to
include any arrangement for two years after the sale whereby the
selling investment adviser receives any compensation from the in-
vestment company other than payments for bona fide services.5 In
addition, the enactment of section 15(f) in 1975 was accompanied
by another amendment of section 15(c) to provide in effect that
investment company directors, in determining what fee the com-
pany should pay its investment adviser, cannot take into account
any price the adviser might have paid to acquire its business from
the company's previous investment adviser.56
JUDICIAL OPINIONS
As suggested above, the framers of both the original Investment
Company Act of 1940 and subsequent amendments to the Act recog-
nized the limitations of unaffiliated and disinterested directors in
protecting investment company shareholders with regard to con-
flicts of interest on the part of the company's management. They
sought to compensate for these limitations by providing for a variety
of regulatory safeguards in the Act. Nonetheless, in an industry as
complicated and sophisticated as the investment company indus-
try, it was perhaps inevitable that a practice involving a conflict of
interest would develop which was not specifically regulated by the
53. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(b) (Supp. V 1975).
54. Id. § 80a-15(f)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 80a-15(f)(2)(B).
56. Id. § 80a-15(c). See also note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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Act, and where reliance would have to be placed upon unaffiliated
or disinterested directors to determine the propriety of the practice
with regard to individual investment companies. Accordingly, the
role of such directors is central in the series of judicial opinions
dealing with the issue of whether the management of an open-end
investment company, or mutual fund, is free to engage in either
customer-directed "give-up""? or reciprocal brokerage" practices
in order to encourage sales of the mutual fund's shares, or whether,
instead, brokerage commissions must be "recaptured" by the fund
to the extent possible" in order to reduce its brokerage costs.
The conflict of interest faced by a mutual fund's investment ad-
viser with regard to this issue is manifest. Since the fees earned by
mutual fund advisers are based upon a percentage of the fund's
assets, the allocation of brokerage commissions generated in connec-
tion with the fund's portfolio transactions to broker-dealers as a
reward for those broker-dealers' sales of the fund's shares would
clearly benefit the adviser by tending to increase the amount of the
fund's asset base and hence the amount of the advisory fee. Any
benefit to a mutual fund's shareholders resulting from growth of the
57. Prior to the elimination of fixed stock exchange commission rates, mutual funds and
other large institutional investors frequently had to pay much higher brokerage commissions
for their portfolio transactions than would otherwise have been necessary. Since mutual
funds' brokerage business was thus highly profitable to broker-dealers, mutual fund managers
were in a position to demand that executing broker-dealers "give up" a portion of their
commission to other broker-dealers who had no part in the transaction which generated the
commission, but whom the mutual fund manager wished to reward for selling shares of the
fund to the public. The New York Stock Exchange abolished such give-ups in December,
1968, and the other stock exchanges took similar action a short time later. See Tannenbaum
v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
58. "Reciprocal brokerage" involves directing a mutual fund's portfolio orders to a partic-
ular broker-dealer as a reward for that broker-dealer's sales of the fund's shares, without
necessarily asking that the commission be shared with any other broker-dealer. Reciprocal
brokerage practices in the mutual fund industry were effectively prohibited by the NASD in
1973, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, Section 2, after the SEC concluded that such
practices could lead to a number of abuses and should be eliminated. See Statement of the
SEC on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets, February 2, 1972, at 19, 37 Fed. Reg.
5286, 5290-91 (1972). However, the Commission later held public hearings to consider sug-
gested interpretations and amendments of the NASD rule which would have the effect of
permitting reciprocal brokerage practices under at least some circumstances. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No, 34-10867, June 20, 1974, 39 Fed. Reg. 24544 (1974). To date, the
Commission has not announced any conclusions resulting from those hearings.
59. • "Recapture" of brokerage commissions could be achieved where the mutual fund's
investment adviser, or an affiliate of the adviser, is a broker-dealer able to execute the fund's
portfolio orders; a portion of the commissions paid to this broker-dealer could be credited
against the advisory fee. The various (and changing) legal considerations associated with such
an arrangement are discussed in Tannebaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 407-09 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12055, January
27, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 8075 (1976) and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13388, March
18, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 16746 (1977).
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fund's asset base is, on the other hand, debatable.'" Conversely, if
the fund followed a brokerage policy designed to result in lower
brokerage costs at the expense of providing extra incentives for
broker-dealers to sell shares of the fund, shareholders would clearly
enjoy the benefit of reduced fund expenses. However, any benefit to
the fund's management would be indirect at best since such benefit
for the most part could derive only from the possibility that lower
brokerage costs would to some extent make the fund more attractive
to investors.
Because the Investment Company Act contains no provision spe-
cifically addressing the question of when, if ever, the management
of a mutual fund must permit the fund to avail itself of a possible
opportunity to recapture brokerage commissions, the courts which
have considered the issue have had to determine whether failure to
recapture results in a breach of fiduciary duty within the meaning
of section 36 of the Act."' The first appellate decision in this area
was that of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Moses
v. Burgin."2 There, the court held that a mutual fund's management
which chose not to have the fund attempt to recapture brokerage
commissions breached its duty to the fund under section 36 of the
Act 3 not because recapture necessarily would have been desirable,
but rather because the fund's management failed properly to advise
the unaffiliated directors of the possibility of recapture. 4 After stat-
ing that "[i]f management does not keep [unaffiliated] directors
informed they will not be in a position to exercise the independent
judgment that Congress clearly intended," 5 the court said:
[I]t was the directors of Fund, not Management, who were the
ones to make the decision [regarding recapture]. That they need
not have decided to experiment is irrelevant. The [district]
60. The question of whether, and if so to what extent, increased sales of mutual fund
shares benefit fund shareholders was one of a number of issues considered by the SEC in
connection with public hearings held in November, 1976. See Investment Company Act
Release No. IC-9470, October 4, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 44770 (1976). The Commission has not
yet announced any conclusions with respect to this issue. See also Freeman, The Use of
Mutual Fund Assets to Pay Marketing Costs, 9 Loy. CHI. L.J. 533 (1978).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970). See also text accompanying note 37 supra and note 49
supra.
62. 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
63. This case arose before § 36(b) was added to the Act in 1970. See text accompanying
notes 37-38 supra.
64. The court did indicate that if recapture was freely available to the fund, the directors
had no discretion to forego recapture. 445 F.2d at 374. However, the court made clear that
its view in this regard was based upon the terms of the fund's charter.
65. 445 F.2d at 377.
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court's ruling does not excuse Management from its failure to dis-
close and so permit the unaffiliated directors to decide. 6
Similar reasoning was subsequently adopted by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in the case of Fogel v. Chestnutt.7 As in
Moses, the Fogel court in effect conceded that there might have
been sound business reasons militating against a decision for the
fund to seek to recapture brokerage commissions. Nonetheless, the
court held that the mutual fund's management had breached its
fiduciary duty under section 36 of the Investment Company Act by
failing to communicate effectively the possibility of recapture to the
fund's disinterested directors ."
Since the decisions in both Moses and Fogel turned upon a failure
to provide sufficient information to investment companies' unaffi-
liated directors,7" those courts did not have to address the seemingly
more difficult question of whether the unaffiliated directors would
have been in a position to protect the interests of shareholders ade-
quately if they had been fully informed by the funds' management
concerning the possibility of recapture. That question did arise,
however, in connection with the opinion of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Tannenbaum v. Zeller.71 Like Moses and Fogel,
Tannenbaum dealt with the issue of whether a mutual fund's failure
to recapture brokerage commissions resulted in a breach of fiduciary
duty within the meaning of section 36 of the Investment Company
Act. However, in Tannenbaum the court concluded that the mutual
fund's disinterested directors, who constituted a majority of the
fund's board," had been "fully informed by the adviser and the
interested directors of the possibility of recapture and the alterna-
tive uses of brokerage . . . ."I Nonetheless, the court made clear
that supplying full information to the disinterested directors would
not have been enough to avoid a breach of duty on the part of the
fund's management if the decision to forego recapture had not also
been a reasonable business decision made by disinterested directors
66. Id. at 383.
67. 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 756.
69. Id. at 748-49.
70. See also Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976), holding in part that
a mutnal fund's investment adviser breached its duty to the fund under § 36(b) of the Act
by prevailing upon the fund's directors to approve a modification of the advisory contract
without making clear to the directors that the modification would result in the adviser not
having to make a rebate of expenses to the fund which otherwise would be required.
71. 552 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
72. Id. at 411.
73. Id. at 427.
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who "were not dominated or unduly influenced by the investment
adviser." 4 In concluding that the fund's board of directors was in
fact a "well-qualified" one which "did not merely rubber-stamp the
recommendations" of the management company,75 the court re-
viewed in considerable depth the nature of the consideration given
to recapture by the disinterested directors." That consideration in-
volved the formation of a subcommittee which examined, among
other things, relevant SEC releases and an opinion of counsel, and
which reported to the full board of directors.77
POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTITUTING JUDGMENT OF GENUINELY INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS FOR REGULATORY STRICTURES
If independent investment company directors-that is, those
who are not only technically disinterested but also, in the words of
the Tannenbaum opinion, are "well-qualified" and "not dominated
or unduly influenced by the investment adviser," and do "not
merely rubber-stamp" the investment adviser's recommenda-
tions-can be relied upon to protect the interests of the company
in an area as complicated and filled with conflict of interest as a
decision concerning the desirability of recapturing brokerage com-
missions, it is reasonable to suppose that such independent direc-
tors could be relied upon to protect the interests of investment com-
panies with respect to matters which are now the subject of regula-
tory limitations." A shift, however limited, from reliance upon regu-
latory strictures to reliance upon independent directors' discretion
in determining the propriety of various types of investment com-
pany transactions and activities could be of significant benefit to
not only the investment company industry, but also public investors
and the SEC.
For example, legal fees associated with the filing of applications
for Commission orders under sections 17(b) and 17(d) of the Invest-
ment Company Act to permit transactions with affiliated persons"9
undoubtedly represent, by themselves, a significant cost to the in-
vestment company industry in the aggregate. A less obvious, but
potentially more troubling, cost might result to the extent that,
because applications under these and other sections of the Act
74. Id. at 418.
75. Id. at 427.
76. Id. at 419-26.
77. Id.
78. For discussion of various regulatory limitations, see text accompanying notes 12-20
supra.
79. For further discussion of these provisions, see text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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sometimes are so complex that their processing by the Commission
staff can involve considerable delay, there might be cases where
investment companies choose to forego transactions which would be
in the interest of their shareholders but for which a Commission
order would be necessary. Manifestly, the burden upon the invest-
ment company industry resulting from the regulatory requirements
of the Investment Company Act, and the burden upon the SEC
resulting from the administration of those requirements, would be
alleviated to the extent that investment companies having a major-
ity of independent directors could be exempted, either by legislation
or SEC rules,0 from some of the Act's restrictions.81
The difficulty, of course, lies in defining what is meant by
"independent" investment company directors. Clearly it would not
be feasible to adopt the approach used by the Tannenbaum court
in deciding whether an investment company's directors are inde-
pendent, since that approach involved a detailed examination by
the court of the nature of the consideration given to a particular
issue by the company's directors."' Such examination of directors'
80. The SEC has broad power under § 6(c) of the Investment Company Act to grant
exemptive relief from provisions of the Act. For further discussion of the SEC's power to grant
exemptive relief, see note 15 supra. However, in view of the far-reaching nature of the exemp-
tions being discussed here, it might be more appropriate to provide such exemptions by
means of legislation, whether or not the SEC has the power to provide them administratively.
81. An alternative approach would be to allow an investment company with less than a
majority of independent directors to qualify for the exemptions also, provided that those
matters as to which exemptions were provided were approved by a majority of the directors
who were independent. This would be consistent with the treatment of investment advisory
and principal underwriting contracts under § 15(c) of the Act and the selection of indepen-
dent auditors under § 32(a) of the Act. For further discussion of these provisions, see note 34
supra.
82. In this connection, it is interesting to note that, after deciding Tannenbaum, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Lasker v. Burks, No. 77-7060, 46 U.S.L.W. 2388
(decided Jan. 11, 1978), that a mutual fund's disinterested directors could not terminate a
non-frivolous shareholder's derivative action against the fund's investment adviser and inter-
ested directors. The suit involved an allegation that the defendants had violated, among other
things, their fiduciary duty under the Investment Company Act with respect to certain
investments made by the fund in securities issued by the Penn Central Company. The district
court had held that the disinterested directors could bar further prosecution of the action,
after finding that those directors had in fact acted independently of management with respect
to the matter. The court of appeals, without considering whether the district court had been
correct in finding the disinterested directors to be genuinely independent, concluded that,
since tatutorily disinterested directors were intended to provide a check upon the actions of
directors controlled by the investment adviser, it "would be contrary to the legislative pur-
pose to permit the independent minority to be used to approve majority action so that no
stockholder complaint could survive that approval." Id. at 2388. The court noted that in "the
ordinary routine business of running an investment trust, the disinterested directors must
constantly deal with interested directors in a spirit of accomodation," and that "they are
compelled for the most part to rely on the information and expert advice provided by the
adviser and the majority directors." Id. at 2389. The court then stated that it "is asking too
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deliberations by the Commission on a case-by-case basis would ap-
pear at least as burdensome as the present system of making trans-
actions subject to Commission scrutiny by means of applications for
orders permitting the transaction.
Nor would it seem fruitful to attempt to avoid such a case-by-case
analysis by formulating general standards regarding the type of con-
sideration directors must give to various issues in order to be re-
garded as independent. The type of consideration which would be
appropriate in each case obviously would depend upon the nature
of the matter being considered, and the potential variety of such
matters is limited only by the bounds of the imagination of invest-
ment company managers. The difficulties associated with an at-
tempt to formulate standards regarding the type of consideration by
disinterested directors which might permit the substitution of such
directors' judgment for that of the SEC with regard to matters now
subject to regulation is suggested by the discussion of the Reporters
for the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code project 3
of their attempt to develop a new approach to the treatment of joint
transactions between investment companies and affiliated persons
under section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act. 84 After describ-
ing section 17(d) as having been, "because of its generality, perhaps
the single most troublesome provision in the entire statute,81 5 the
Reporters said that they had been prompted
to attempt an entirely new approach to the section designed to
clarify its coverage and relax its strictness to the extent of interpos-
ing the noninterested directors to blunt the intrusion of court or
-Commission in reviewing a challenged transaction. But disagree-
ment among the Consultants and Advisers with respect to an ac-
ceptable (let alone a desirable) solution of the problems-together
with the rejection of proposed changes by spokesmen for the indus-
try-has induced the Reporters, particularly in the light of the
Code's limited approach to substantive revision of the Investment
Company Act, to leave §17(d) substantially as it is today.8
Accordingly, it might be more useful to attempt to ascertain
which disinterested directors can be regarded as genuinely indepen-
much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will view with the necessary
objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a situation where an adverse decision would be
likely to result in considerable expense and liability for the individuals concerned." Id.
83. AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE FED. SEC. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 6, April 1, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ALI DRAFT].
84. This provision is discussed at note 13 supra and accompanying text.
85. AL DRAFT, supra note 83, at 182.
86. Id. at 183-84.
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dent by focusing the inquiry instead upon the types of individuals
who would be qualified to act as independent directors, and upon
the kinds of procedures they should follow in connection with their
deliberations.
Qualification standards, of course, already exist in a number of
other contexts. For example, the SEC has prescribed examination
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 with re-
gard to broker-dealers."8 Moreover, physicians, attorneys, and mem-
bers of other professions must meet various education requirements
and pass examinations. However, it may be considerably more diffi-
cult to prescribe qualification standards for independent invest-
ment company directors. The potential variety of decisions which
such a director could be asked to make in connection with his duties
is so great that it might not be feasible to devise an examination to
test his qualifications, as has been done with respect to broker-
dealers. Furthermore, although such professionals as physicians and
attorneys might be called upon to deal with a wide variety of prob-
lems, there exists at least general agreement as to the kind of educa-
tion and basic knowledge which an individual should possess in
order to practice those professions. It is not clear that such an agree-
ment could be obtained with respect to independent investment
company directors. For example, a requirement that such a director
have an educational or practical background in business, finance,
or law would apparently have excluded at least three of the twelve
directors which the Tannenbaum court in effect found to be inde-
pendent.8 In this connection, it might be noted that in 1976 legisla-
tion was introduced in the Senate0 to amend the Investment Advis-
ers Act of 19401 to provide, among other things, authority for the
SEC to prescribe qualification standards with regard to investment
advisers. The legislation was reported favorably by the Senate com-
mittee92 but was not passed. In opposing the bill, Senator Helms,
in his minority views, quoted the following testimony by John L.
Casey, Chairman of the Investment Counsel Association of Amer-
ica:
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-1 (1977). The SEC examination requirements relate only to
broker-dealers who are not members of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.;
that oiganization, however, administers an examination for membership.
89. 552 F.2d 402, 411 n.9. One such director was president of a science foundation and a
former college president; another was an authority on medical questions; and a third was a
consultant on scientific matters.
90. S. 2849, Calendar No. 866, S. REP'. No. 94-910, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
91. Investment Advisers Act, ch. 686, title II, § 201 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (1970), as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§80b-1 et seq. (Supp. V 1975)).
92. S. REP. No. 94-910, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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One point on qualification is that investing is certainly not a
precise science, and the disclosure route of qualifications may well
be better than prescribing that somebody have a background in
fundamental analysis. If we are the purists in the industry, never-
theless we recognize that there ought to be room for people who
suggest random selection, or the seat-of-the-pants investor, or the
technical point and figure artist or even the astrologer or the I-
Ching coin tosser."
Nonetheless, it might not be totally fruitless to pursue the possi-
bility of considering a director's background and experience as one
measure of whether he can be regarded as independent. Even if
generally applicable standards could not be formulated, it might be
possible to devise a procedure whereby the SEC would determine
in individual cases whether a person was qualified to serve as an
independent director. Although it is unlikely that either the invest-
ment company industry or the SEC would relish the prospect of the
Commission passing upon the qualifications of investment company
directors, it should be emphasized that such consideration by the
SEC would be only for the purpose of deciding whether the directors
were independent and, thus, whether the company which they serve
would qualify for exemption from one or more provisions of the
Investment Company Act. Presumably, a director which the SEC
did not, for this purpose, find qualified to act independently would
not thereby be precluded from serving as either an interested or a
disinterested investment company director in accordance with the
present provisions of the Act.9"
Of course, having the SEC determine the qualifications of inde-
pendent directors even on a case-by-case basis would require the
Commission to formulate some criteria for measuring such qualifi-
cations, even though the criteria could be modified in light of the
facts of a particular case. Since, as suggested above, the formulation
of any standards in this area would be difficult at best, it may be
useful to consider supplementing the SEC's determinations with
regard to the qualifications of independent directors by prescribing
93. Id. at 18.
94. Germany's counterpart of the Investment Company Act provides that, in general, the
members of an investment company's board of supervisors "are to guarantee a safeguarding
of the interests of the shareholders by virtue of their personal integrity and their special
knowledge," and that the "bank supervisory authority shall be notified without delay of the
appointment of the board of supervisors and of every change of the members of the board of
supervisors." Law Concerning Capital Investment Companies, First Chapter, Section 4
(1970), translated in TORMANN, THE INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS 106 (1973). However, it is not
clear whether this provision gives the German authorities power to pass upon the qualifica-
tions of the members of an investment company's board of supervisors.
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procedures which independent directors should follow in connection
with their decision-making. The formulation of these standards
might be somewhat less difficult than the formulation of standards
defining the qualifications of independent directors.
For example, a number of observers of the investment company
industry have suggested that an investment company's disinter-
ested directors should have the advice of either their own counsel
or counsel for the fund who is separate from the management's
counsel .1 The absence of independent counsel was one of the factors
cited by the SEC in PPI as contributing to the relative ineffective-
ness of unaffiliated directors. 6 It would seem that the value of such
counsel in helping to ensure independent consideration of issues by
the disinterested directors is beyond dispute, if only because inde-
pendent counsel will tend to marshal arguments to balance those
presented by management in matters involving conflicts of interest,
and will help ensure that management's position is thoroughly ex-
amined.
The absence of independent staff on the part of unaffiliated direc-
tors was also noted by the Commission in PPI17 It might be useful
for the independent directors to have their own staff, perhaps on a
periodic consulting basis, in addition to legal counsel. For example,
accountants who are not employed by management could be of
significant assistance to the independent directors in connection
with their consideration of complex financial matters.
Finally, it would seem appropriate to insist that independent
directors conduct at least a portion of their deliberations in meet-
ings not attended by interested directors or representatives of man-
agement. This procedure appears to have been followed by the inde-
pendent directors in Tannenbaum,9" and it likely would be useful if
only because of its tendency to encourage frank discussion of man-
agement's position.
CONCLUSION
At least until additional consideration has been given to the sub-
ject, it will not be possible to suggest a general means of determining
whether investment company directors are genuinely independent.
Even if such consideration is given, there is no assurance that it will
95. See, e.g., Lipton, Directors of Mutual Funds: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1259,
1262 (1976).
96. PPI, supra note 24, at 130-31. For further discussion of these factors, see notes 26-28
supra and accompanying text.
97. Id.
98. 552 F.2d 402, 421 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 421 (1977).
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generate a practical set of standards. However, if the independence
of disinterested investment company directors could be assured to
a greater degree than has heretofore been the case, it might be
feasible to relax some of the regulatory strictures presently imposed
by the Investment Company Act and substitute the judgment of
those independent directors. The benefits which such a substitution
could produce for the investment company industry, public share-
holders, and the federal government would make an attempt' in this
area well worthwhile.
